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Unacceptable Discretion: 
Countering Tax Avoidance and 




The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not arbitrary. The 
time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought all to be clear and 
plain to the contributor, and to every other person. Where it is otherwise the taxpayer is 
put more or less in the hands of the tax gatherer.  
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations. 
The need to raise taxes is central to the organisation of any civilised state. It is 
something of a paradox that to do so requires the forcible extraction of cash from 
individual citizens — an action which breaches another attribute of a free 
society: the protection of private property. This article examines the practical 
and legal problems raised by this tension between the need to prevent loss of tax 
revenues through avoidance and the rights of the private citizen not to have his 
property taken from him arbitrarily. 
This question is not an abstract one concerned only with the rights of the 
individual. The legitimate desire of the state to protect its revenues from the 
ravages of the marauding tax planner — particularly those advising businesses 
— can easily lead to the introduction of legislative and administrative measures 
which interfere with commercial activity. 
The temptation to deal with difficult points of legal definition by conferring 
an administrative discretion on Revenue authorities may be hard for a 
government to resist. To give in to the temptation can result in those authorities 
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being given, in effect, the discretionary power to tax without any workable 
restraints being imposed on the exercise of that discretion. 
This article considers some ways in which this problem has manifested itself 
in the United Kingdom in recent years; it examines the remedies open to the 
taxpayer aggrieved by the arbitrary exercise of administrative discretion and tries 
to draw some conclusions on how government should approach this problem in 
the future. 
I. HISTORY 
To understand the difficulties facing the tax raisers in the 1990s, it is necessary 
to go back and look at the history of taxpaying in this country and the problems 
and solutions that have arisen over the last 75 years or so. 
As a preliminary point, it should be emphasised that this article is concerned 
with the problems of tax avoidance — the legitimate use of rules to mitigate tax 
liability — rather than tax evasion — the illegal non-payment of tax rightfully 
due. 
The existence of the concept of tax avoidance in the UK is itself indicative of 
the approach to tax collecting here. The implication of the word ‘avoidance’ is 
that there is something to avoid — in this case an intention of the law to catch 
the taxpayer which has failed. While such an intent undoubtedly exists behind 
every taxing statute, its existence is studiously ignored by the Courts. This 
apparently curious result has grown out of the approach of the UK Courts to the 
interpretation of tax law. 
Judges have been quite categorical that the collection of tax must be by the 
clear words of the taxing statute regardless of any purpose or mischief which 
may lie behind it. The stated rationale for this approach was the need for 
certainty — a taxpayer must be clear as to what his liability to tax is. In one very 
well-worn phrase, ‘There is no room for any intendment; there is no equity about 
a tax: there is no presumption as to a tax; you read nothing in; you imply 
nothing, but you look fairly at what is said and at what is said clearly and that is 
the tax’.
1 This approach — although perhaps slightly modified in recent years — 
has formed the basis for all tax avoidance arrangements and has, no doubt, led to 
the frustration of legislators and administrators. 
It has also led to the somewhat complicated games of avoidance schemes and 
countering legislation which has characterised the development of so much tax 
legislation this century. These games are played in somewhat slow time — not 
least because of the speed (or lack of it) of the legislative process, but also 
because of the slow reaction of the legislature to countering specific avoidance 
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schemes which reflected the seriousness with which tax raising used to be 
approached. 
There is no doubt that the slow response of the legislators to avoidance 
schemes meant that for many years the boot tended to be firmly on the taxpayer’s 
foot. This can be seen particularly in relation to certain tax avoidance schemes 
between the wars. 
1. Between the Wars 
The history of surtax avoidance in the 1920s and 1930s is an extraordinary 
chronicle of mismanagement by the authorities
2 — devices designed to allow 
surtax payers to divest themselves of income proliferated. The failure of the 
Inland Revenue to take the right cases through the Courts followed by its 
subsequent failure to procure suitable anti-avoidance legislation for nearly 10 
years left large loopholes for well-advised taxpayers to gallop through. It appears 
that only the promotion of some of the more blatant schemes in the popular press 
spurred the Revenue into some sort of action. 
What is interesting about this period is that the subject of tax avoidance was 
regarded as being sufficiently serious to merit a Cabinet Committee devoted to 
it, and despite initial failings at both the political and administrative levels, the 
legislation eventually enacted had been carefully considered by both the 
Revenue and by Ministers before becoming law. 
2. Post-1945 
After (and indeed during) the war the process continued much as before — the 
loopholes in legislation were progressively stopped by a series of specific and 
detailed measures; nowhere more so than in the area of dividend stripping and 
bond washing. 
The problems in this area stem from the differing tax treatment of income 
from shares and the capital gains arising on sale. A series of detailed measures 
were introduced from the 1930s to the 1950s designed to prevent individuals 
from divesting themselves of income from shares by various devices of sales and 
repurchases. The success of ingenious advisers in circumventing each new set of 
anti-avoidance measures resulted in the enactment of s.28 FA 1960 (now s.703 
Taxes Act 1988) which introduced a wide-ranging anti-avoidance measure aimed 
at ‘transactions in securities’ generally.
3 
The difficulty with specific anti-avoidance devices is that if they are not to 
catch the innocent party they must be tightly drawn; but if they are too tightly 
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drawn they may fail to catch the situation at which they are aimed. The 1960 
legislation was widely drawn but aimed at transactions which the Revenue had 
found itself powerless to counter with existing legislation. Precisely because the 
legislation was so widely drawn, it was introduced with a ‘bona fide 
commercial’ let-out — so that a taxpayer who was inadvertently caught by the 
wide reach of the provisions could avoid their application if he could show that 
he had a good commercial reason for effecting the transactions in question and 
was not motivated by tax avoidance. This in turn led to the introduction of a 
clearance procedure — the earliest such procedure still on the statute book. This 
allows a taxpayer to apply to the Revenue in advance of any transaction for a 
binding view as to whether the provisions will or will not apply to him. The 
inclusion of such a procedure was an acknowledgement that the introduction of a 
bona fide test introduced a degree of subjectivity and hence uncertainty into the 
taxing statutes which was unacceptable without some means for a taxpayer to 
determine his position in advance. 
The 1960 legislation, containing, as it did, potentially draconian powers to 
prevent tax avoidance, was the subject of vigorous debate in Parliament both at 
the time and as later amendments were brought through. It was criticised on the 
ground that it gave the executive a discretionary power to levy tax on a 
transaction not expressly made taxable by Parliament. Assurances were given in 
Parliament that the provisions would only be applied to the specific 
circumstances at which they were aimed. Despite such assurances, the Revenue 
subsequently sought to apply the provisions to situations never contemplated at 
the time of their introduction. When, in due course, this approach was challenged 
in the Courts, one judge’s reaction was: ‘having provided reasonable safeguards 
for the bona fide or ordinary transactions I do not think that the legislature has 
given any indication of intending to use kid gloves in these cases’.
4 
The provisions of s.703 which emanated in the 1960s continue to dog tax 
advisers in the 1990s and the need to obtain advance clearance for commercial 
transactions which incidentally obtain a tax advantage for the parties is a 
considerable drag on a number of transactions. In addition, the tension between 
these provisions and other provisions of the legislation conferring tax reliefs is 
not always clear cut — the Revenue has been known to use s.703 to deny the 
benefit of other explicit relieving provisions of the legislation based solely on its 
view of what those provisions were intended to catch.
5 The absence of any 
effective appeal procedure against a refusal of the Revenue to give clearance in 
such a case means that the Revenue holds an effective discretion to block such 
transactions. 
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3. Post-1960 
In 1960 the draftsman of s.703 acknowledged the width of the scope of the 
provisions by providing for the ‘bona fide commercial’ let-out. It is unfortunate 
that this approach has only been followed in one subsequent set of anti-
avoidance provisions — those relating to exchanges of shares. Since then the 
trend has been to draft for the specific wider than necessary and to deal with any 
cases caught unintentionally by concession. A few examples will make this trend 
clear: 
(1)  In recent years the increased amount of cross-border activity has increased 
the opportunities that exist for tax mitigation between jurisdictions. One 
fertile area for the tax planner has lain in the field of treaty shopping — the 
use of the UK’s extensive network of double tax treaties to move interest 
and other financial flows out of the UK and around the world free of 
withholding taxes. Treaties generally provide for a reduced or zero rate of 
tax on interest flows between the treaty parties. The Revenue’s (legitimate) 
concern is that a treaty with one country should not be used as a means for 
residents of third countries to re-route their interest flows to escape 
withholding which would otherwise apply (although it is a nice question in 
the 1990s whether effective taxation of the return on capital is ever 
possible). 
It is a difficult question how effective restriction of the abuse of treaties 
should be achieved. Detailed discussion of this is beyond the scope of this 
article but, in broad terms, the choice lies between a purely formalistic 
approach where the benefit of the treaty is given or denied on the basis of a 
set of rules which take no account of the motive of the taxpayer but look 
only to the circumstances — such as ownership, source of funds etc. — and 
a motive test where the question of whether the transaction is bona fide or 
motivated by tax avoidance determines the application of the relevant treaty 
provisions. The trend seems to be for the Revenue to adopt a formalistic 
approach following the lead of the United States but without the let-out for 
bona fide commercial transactions.
6 Recent provisions have been widely 
drawn, without any regard to the taxpayer’s motive.
7 An innocently affected 
party has no legal redress but will have to seek discretionary relief from the 
Revenue. 
(2)  Concern over the perceived abuse of the reliefs afforded to groups of 
companies has led to ever-increasing amounts of complex legislation 
attempting to define when a group does or does not exist. The problem was 
regarded as sufficiently serious to justify several dense pages of legislation 
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in 1992.
8 While the legislation was going through Parliament, the Revenue 
and Ministers acknowledged that the drafting is deficient, so an extra-
statutory concession has had to be published at the same time as the 
legislation.
9 It is of considerable concern that legislation can be subjected to 
parliamentary scrutiny at the same time as the executive exercises a 
discretion not to apply the legislation as enacted. 
(3)  The final example also comes from the Finance (No. 2) Act 1992. Late in 
the course of preparation of the Finance Bill, the Revenue lost a case before 
the Appeal Commissioners on so-called ‘equity notes’. These were 
perpetual debt instruments issued by UK companies to US parent 
companies which had the characteristics of debt in the UK (so giving a tax 
deduction for interest paid) but were treated under US rules as being equity 
instruments. As a result of this treatment, the return was treated as 
dividends for US tax purposes rather than interest — this having significant 
US tax benefits. It is debatable whether it is the UK or the US exchequer 
which loses from such arrangements, but the Revenue took the view that it 
was the UK and that action had to be taken immediately. 
Legislation was drafted and brought forward with extreme haste and is 
now on the statute book.
10 Although the statute goes further than was 
intended and it has therefore been left to the discretion of the Revenue 
authorities to apply it in a more restricted way, there is no reference to tax 
advantage or any indication as to the mischief to which the provisions are 
aimed. There is no bona fide let-out and as a result if the Revenue ever 
seeks to apply the provisions more widely in the future, the taxpayer will be 
left with no effective right of appeal. What is more, because there is no 
formal clearance mechanism, taxpayers concerned about the possible 
application of the provisions — and this will include many foreign investors 
setting up UK subsidiaries — will need to obtain express confirmation from 
the Revenue that the provisions will not apply to their particular situation or 
will have to structure their affairs so as to avoid the application of the new 
rules. 
What seems to have happened in this case is that a legitimate desire to 
protect the revenue has overridden any concern for the fairness of the 
provisions. The reluctance of the Revenue and, apparently, of Ministers to 
subject themselves to the public scrutiny of parliamentary procedure is 
evidenced by a statement by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury which 
acknowledges that the provisions have been deliberately drafted in a 
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‘flexible’ way so that Parliament need not be troubled with having to 
consider further legislation on this topic in future years!
11  
These examples (all of which reflect law still on the statute book) disclose an 
interesting trend: the legalistic approach between the wars was supplemented by 
the introduction of a ‘bona fide commercial’ test in 1960 which acknowledged 
that the legislation went further than necessary and which contained a clear 
statement of the ‘tax advantages’ that were to be countered. Subsequently 
legislation has continued to be wide-ranging but has been tempered, not by a 
statutory test of bona fide commerciality but by largely non-reviewable Revenue 
discretion and subject, apparently, to possible extension in future years by 
Ministers or the Inland Revenue. 
II. RIGHTS OF APPEAL 
Most taxing provisions carry with them some right of appeal and it is worth 
looking briefly at what these are and how effective they can be in dealing with 
any abuse of these provisions. 
Any assessment to tax carries with it a right to appeal; the appeal mechanism 
is straightforward and well understood. Appeals proceed through a private 
hearing of the Appeal Commissioners to the High Court, the Court of Appeal 
and ultimately the House of Lords. An appeal has to be based on a wrong 
understanding of the facts by the Revenue or on a wrong interpretation of the law 
— a taxpayer might appeal against an assessment under s.703 on the ground that 
the transactions were in fact bona fide commercial (a question of fact) or against 
the denial of benefit of treaty relief on the basis that the Revenue had wrongly 
interpreted the provisions of the Treaty. On the face of it, the appeal mechanism 
would appear to be sufficient to protect the taxpayer from any concern of abuse 
of powers by the Revenue. 
The problems with the appeal procedure are twofold — it does not always 
apply and it involves significant cost and delay. Taking a complex commercial 
case through the Appeal Commissioners can cost upwards of 250,000, and to 
take such a matter through to the House of Lords can cost two or three times 
that. This factor alone is a major disincentive to taking any matter to appeal and 
often enables settlement of tax liability to be achieved by the Inland Revenue 
simply because the taxpayer considers the cost of appeal higher than the amount 
of tax for which he is being asked to settle. 
In addition to the basic right of appeal against an assessment, there are 
provisions whereby the decision of tax authorities can be reviewed (a so-called 
‘judicial review’). It is well established that judicial review proceedings cannot 
be brought unless the other appeal mechanisms have been exhausted or are not 
                                                                                                                                    
11 Hansard, 30 June 1992, col. 446. 
 Tax Avoidance 
135 
appropriate. Judicial review therefore applies to such matters as the failure of the 
Inland Revenue to apply published statements, a refusal to rely on an agreement 
previously made and similar matters involving unfairness and abuse of power. 
The tendency to use the judicial review procedures has increased in recent years 
and it has now become established that the Revenue not only has a duty to act 
fairly and consistently but that it can be held, in certain circumstances, to the 
wording of any statement or commitment which it gives even if this is not 
necessarily consistent with the strict letter of the statutory provisions. 
Despite the developments of recent years, the circumstances in which the 
Revenue’s behaviour can be reviewed are still considerably limited and the 
Courts will, as a first principle, respect the fact that the Revenue’s primary 
obligation is to collect those taxes which are due under the statutes. What the 
Courts cannot do is to review the content of the legislation and determine 
whether it does what Parliament intended or whether it goes further than 
necessary. Nor can they determine the purpose for which the legislation was 
introduced and relieve the taxpayer from its application because his 
circumstances do not meet that purpose if in fact he fits within the clear words of 
the section. In such cases the taxpayer has to rely on the discretion of the 
Revenue not to apply the provisions to him, and if it chooses not to do so, he has 
no recourse to the Courts.
12 
III. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS 
So far this article may appear to be a somewhat theoretical treatise on the rights 
of the taxpayer rather than pointing up problems in the real world. But those 
problems exist. 
The corporate taxpayer undertaking a complex reorganisation of its structure 
motivated for purely commercial reasons will need to be satisfied that the anti-
avoidance provisions of s.703 will not apply to it — here a statutory clearance 
procedure and a bona fide commercial test exist in the legislation and the 
additional cost involved in obtaining the necessary clearances will probably be 
regarded as a justifiable expense in the course of the overall transaction. 
When one turns to the problems of the multinational group investing in the 
UK, the problems take on a somewhat different complexion. To pick only two 
areas: the unwritten rules on thin capitalisation and the written but uncertain 
rules on equity notes make it very difficult for the investor to set up and finance 
his UK subsidiary without some comfort from the Revenue as to whether the 
debt finance of his subsidiary will be at an acceptable level and not fall foul of 
the equity note provisions. No doubt that comfort will be given but to what 
extent can it be relied on — does he want to risk the uncertainties of judicial 
review should the Revenue change its mind? Even if he does, the availability of 
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judicial review is dependent on the Revenue having been provided with all the 
material facts — is he satisfied that he has done this? 
These are real points and real problems and ones which the professional tax 
adviser has to face every day. But in many cases they stem from one single point 
of difference between the taxpayer and the Revenue — is what is proposed a 
legitimate commercial aim or unacceptable tax planning? 
While it may have been very clear in the 1930s what surtax was intended to 
catch and how the tax avoidance schemes avoided it, it is considerably less 
certain in the 1990s what the tax bill of a multinational company ‘ought’ to be. 
There is no clear intention or mischief to the legislation — just a complex web 
of taxing and relieving provisions interacting with each other and with other 
jurisdictions to produce a liability to tax. 
IV. DEFINING LEGITIMATE TAX PLANNING 
The debate about the boundaries of legitimate tax planning has ranged far and 
wide and there will always be differences of view. What can be agreed is that 
this question can never be definitively answered. The boundaries move with 
public sentiment, with developing financial techniques and with the introduction 
of new statutory reliefs. Tax law will always have to address this question and to 
determine where the line will be drawn. 
There is no doubt that the Revenue, for all its size and the high quality of its 
personnel, suffers from a major failing: it is trying to track techniques and 
transactions devised by others and it does not have the financial resources of the 
private sector at its command. 
The Revenue’s view of the private sector and those who work in it on tax 
advice is well illustrated by a comment made by the Financial Secretary to the 
Treasury in the debate on equity notes referred to above. One has to believe that 
this comment, if not drafted by his Revenue advisers, at least reflects their views 
in the matter (this comment follows on from a justification of a particular form 
of drafting on the basis that it is required in order to prevent the provisions being 
circumvented): ‘That serves to reinforce the fact that we are dealing with people 
of almost infinite ingenuity, and that our task is to try to keep ahead of them’.
13 
The problem is a real one for Ministers — according to Revenue figures, the 
amount of tax at stake in relation to equity notes was likely to exceed 150 
million. The pressure to accept the legislation as drafted without too much 
concern as to whether the drafting goes further than strictly necessary or whether 
adequate protection for other taxpayers is contained in the provisions must be 
acute. There are inevitably few commercial lobby groups pressing for more 
fairly drafted anti-avoidance legislation. The growth in legislation dependent on 
administrative discretion for its proper operation which results from this attitude 
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is worrying and the time has undoubtedly come when a more thorough review of 
both the method of tax law making and the specific means needed to counter tax 
avoidance is needed. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The problem that emerges from this can be summarised as follows: the purely 
legalistic approach of the early years of anti-avoidance legislation was not 
adequate. Wide-ranging legislation was necessary in certain areas. Initially that 
legislation was drafted with care and with adequate safeguards for the actions of 
the Revenue to be reviewed by the Courts. Under the pressure of time and the 
increased pace of commercial activities, the wide-ranging approach has been 
retained but less and less regard has been paid to the safeguards for the taxpayer. 
To protect the exchequer, it has proved necessary (or at least expedient) to 
increase the administrative and discretionary power given to the Inland Revenue. 
While protection of the exchequer is necessary, the Revenue, as 
administrators and collectors of taxes, is not the right body to be the ultimate 
arbiter as to what constitutes legitimate tax avoidance. If Parliament is not 
willing or able to tackle the task itself, it must be left to the judiciary and not to 
the executive. In the words of one judge, a taxpayer should be ‘taxed by law and 
not untaxed by concession’.
14 
VI. SOLUTIONS 
(1)  To start to resolve these issues, it would help if there were a generally 
accepted definition of unacceptable tax avoidance. While this might seem 
impossible (and certainly beyond the scope of this article), any effective 
attempt by the Revenue to provide a definition has been singularly lacking 
in recent years. It does not seem to have been accepted by the Revenue that 
it should be given, at least in part, to the Courts to review and modify as 
time passes. The Government and the Revenue appear to be failing to 
recognise that provisions which take away the rights and property of private 
citizens must be properly hedged about by the checks and balances of 
review by the Courts. The time has perhaps come to consider a general anti-
avoidance provision coupled with a ‘bona fide commercial’ let-out to be 
applied in those areas where the drafting of specific anti-avoidance 
measures has become too complex. 
(2)  In devising means to stop tax leakage, Parliament has failed to take into 
account the effect that anti-avoidance provisions have on the many 
businesses and individuals who are not seeking to take advantage of the 
particular loophole that is being addressed. Failure to target legislation 
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tightly and taking the easy (and admittedly effective) scattergun approach 
may achieve the immediate aim, but it increases the administrative burden 
of tax compliance for a large number of other taxpayers and creates an 
atmosphere of uncertainty about the UK system which deters UK and 
overseas investors from investing here. The legislators must have more 
regard to the clarity of legislation. The process by which legislation is 
drafted and amended should be thoroughly reviewed. 
Where a loophole is discovered, the intention to legislate can be 
announced (provided that that intention is clearly stated) but there should 
then be adequate consultation and a real determination to target any 
provisions with certainty and with clarity. Where necessary, a discretion can 
be given to the Revenue as to the application of the provisions but that 
discretion must be properly hedged about with an adequate appeal 
procedure. 
The Revenue is known to be unhappy with its decisions being taken to 
appeal but if this is based on a fear of being found wrong it cannot be 
justified; if on a concern that the Appeal Commissioners tend to find for the 
taxpayers then it reflects either poorly drafted legislation or a good reason 
for allowing the right of appeal in the first place. 
(3)  Although more careful drafting of legislation and making its application 
more subject to review are essential, they can never deal with the infinite 
variety and rapid pace of change of commercial activities (despite the 
Government’s attempts this year to legislate next year’s anti-avoidance 
provisions before they are needed!). 
Serious consideration should be given to a more formal method of 
obtaining binding rulings from the Revenue on particular points. This would 
enable the taxpayer whose activities genuinely go beyond what is 
contemplated by the legislation of the day to seek a binding view from the 
Revenue on his own particular circumstances. There are admittedly a 
number of practical problems to be addressed before such a system can be 
introduced in the UK but these largely come down to two issues: the 
reviewability of the rulings and the administrative cost to the Revenue. 
The first of these has already been addressed — where the Revenue 
gives a view then it should be subject to review by the Courts — it is not 
acceptable in a free society for the tax collector also to be the ultimate 
arbiter of the amounts due.
15 The second point is a practical one — where 
are the resources, both manpower and financial, for any review system to 
come from? The simple answer to this is that where the question on which a 
ruling is sought involves business taxation (as an overwhelming majority of 
difficult tax questions do), there is no reason why the Revenue should not 
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charge for its services. Businesses are prepared to pay for tax advice — why 
should advice which by its very nature will be authoritative not also be paid 
for? There is a clear precedent for this — the fee charged by the OFT for 
the use of the Merger Control process. 
These are some practical suggestions but ultimately the question comes down 
to one of balancing the protection of the revenue with fairness and certainty for 
the taxpayer. In the UK we occupy what I believe to be an enviable position on 
the world tax stage — we lie between the over-regulated over-formalistic 
systems of North America and the rather curious systems of some of the 
European countries operating under the uncertainties inherent in a civil tax code. 
The openness of the UK system combined with the respect which it gives (or 
at least used to give!) for the sanctity of an individual’s private property is 
something of which we should be proud. We should not be proud of the 
complications which have been generated, particularly in the corporate tax 
regime, in recent years without real regard to practical problems for the taxpayer 
and without sufficient concern for certainty and fairness. 
 